In an era of tremendous development in information technology and the Internet of Things (IoT), security plays a key role in safety devices connected with the Internet. Authentication is vital in the security field, and to achieve a strong authentication scheme, there are several systems using a Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) scheme based on a smart card, token, and biometric. However, these schemes have suffered from the extra cost; lost, stolen or broken factor, and malicious attacks. In this paper, we design an MFA protocol to be the authenticated administrator of IoT's devices. The main components of our protocol are a smart mobile device and the fuzzy extractor of the administrator's fingerprint. The information of the authenticated user is stored in an anomalous manner in mobile devices and servers to resist well-known attacks, and, as a result, the attacker fails to authenticate the system when they obtain a mobile device or password. Our work overcomes the above-mentioned issues and does not require extra cost for a fingerprint device. By using the AVISPA tool to analysis protocol security, the results are good and safe against known attacks.
In recent years, Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) [12] [13] [14] was presented for use of a second factor-such as an SMS token, token device, smart card, and biometric with the user's account information-for resisting malicious attacks and solving the memorizing issue in password complexity [15] [16] [17] .
While the security approaches grow in the 2FA field, attackers' methods also increase. Although 2FA schemes are strong, they still suffer from malicious attacks including lost/stolen smart card attacks, taking a fake fingerprint from the original fingerprint, and insider attacks. There is therefore a need for a more secure and strong scheme based on the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to check the validity of users. MFA represents the power source to protect the system against an unauthorized user and reduce the risks of malicious attacks. Principally, MFA consists of various factors such as biometrics (behavioral and biological characteristics), the smart mobile device, token device, and smart card. This type of authentication scheme increases the security degree and allows for the application of identification, verification, and authentication for ensuring user authority. Figure 1 demonstrates the authentication schemes. Currently, MFA is considered a vital part in many fields in the information technology world and is involved in processes such as validating the identity of the administrator of the system, IoT devices, and smart mobile devices (see Figure 2 ). The major advantage for using MFA schemes is to increase security level-"assume an adversary can get user's password by applying malicious attacks but he faces difficulties to retrieve information of another factor" [17] . Furthermore, some MFA schemes use a token device that does not need coverage for a mobile network or the Internet.
MFA does have several drawbacks, such as forgotten/stolen mobile phone, smart card or token device, allowing illegal access to the authorized user's accounts and extra cost for detection resources for the hardware's maintenance centers. For that reason, our work aims to propose a strong and lightweight protocol for user authentication, based on a fuzzy extractor of fingerprints and smart In recent years, Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) [12] [13] [14] was presented for use of a second factor-such as an SMS token, token device, smart card, and biometric with the user's account information-for resisting malicious attacks and solving the memorizing issue in password complexity [15] [16] [17] .
MFA does have several drawbacks, such as forgotten/stolen mobile phone, smart card or token device, allowing illegal access to the authorized user's accounts and extra cost for detection resources for the hardware's maintenance centers. For that reason, our work aims to propose a strong and lightweight protocol for user authentication, based on a fuzzy extractor of fingerprints and smart The major advantage for using MFA schemes is to increase security level-"assume an adversary can get user's password by applying malicious attacks but he faces difficulties to retrieve information of another factor" [17] . Furthermore, some MFA schemes use a token device that does not need coverage for a mobile network or the Internet.
MFA does have several drawbacks, such as forgotten/stolen mobile phone, smart card or token device, allowing illegal access to the authorized user's accounts and extra cost for detection resources for the hardware's maintenance centers. For that reason, our work aims to propose a strong and lightweight protocol for user authentication, based on a fuzzy extractor of fingerprints and smart mobile phone for administrators of IoT devices and server-client systems, among others. The important contributions of our proposed protocol are as follows:
•
We design a secure and robust protocol for authenticating the legal administrator that can play the main role for management of IoT devices in future work or server-client systems. This work has positive features such as mutual authentication, once-secure session key for each login phase, the anonymity of password and biometric, unlinkability, and security against a stolen smart mobile device and online change of password.
We propose an MFA protocol based on a fuzzy extractor of the user's fingerprint, smart mobile phone and an encrypted-credential file that keeps our main factors in safe mode against malicious attacks.
We present a security analysis of our work, and we have noted that our protocol resists the replay attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, insider attacks, offline dictionary attacks, eavesdropping and traffic attacks.
Consequently, we prove the proposed protocol on standard and strong security proof tool AVISPA.
We present the comparative analysis of our proposed protocol with other related work based on security analyses and resisting well-known attacks.
The contents of this paper are as follows. Section 2 presents a related work. Section 3 describes the symbols and cryptography concepts used in our protocol. The details of our proposed protocol are outlined in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the security analysis of our protocol. Section 6 reveals the experimental results using the AVISPA tool. Section 7 refers the comparison with other related works. Section 8 concludes our research.
Related Work
The traditional methods of authentication are to use a PIN code, a password, etc. [18] , and the password here represents knowledge management of the main factor. The researchers then added the second factor to increase the security in the form of a physical token that contributes to strengthening user authentication schemes, e.g., a smart card [19, 20] , and other devices such as a smartphone.
A one-time password method is used to generate one password for each user login request. This method is applied in many systems [21] ; however, its main problem is repetition and it is uncontrollable. In recent years, authors have proposed MFA schemes, and they began by introducing biometrics (physical and behavioral) into authentication schemes-for instance, voice biometrics, face recognition, methods of eye recognition (iris recognition and retinal recognition), hand geometry, fingerprint, electrocardiographic (ECG) recognition, electroencephalographic (EEG) recognition, DNA recognition, etc. There was a problem with regards to biological agents, which was difficult to modify, and this caused security issues in the system.
Chen et al. [22] proposed a scheme by using two main tools: (1) secured mobile phones; and (2) fingerprint of the mobile's user. Their work focused on capturing the front-end and back-end fingerprint recognition system in smart mobile phones. Derawi et al. [23] presented a scheme relying on cameras of smart mobile phones to obtain fingerprint images instead of a scanner device. Moreover, Sin et al. [24] suggested that a system consisted of two phases: the first one is used to build users' templates while the second checks the validity of the user based on their template. This scheme has been applied in the commercial market since 2009. Ravi and Sivanath [25] also presented a scheme that applies a camera to obtain the user's finger image and then computes the background and feature extraction of the fingerprint to authenticate the user.
Dhillon et al. [26] proposed a remote-user authentication protocol for the IoT with three factors-passwords, smart cards and biometrics. Park and Park [13] proposed a biometric authentication system and used a fuzzy extractor, smartcard and elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC). Their work resists attacks and uses BAN logic to provide a mutual authentication.
However, these factors can be stolen, lost or broken, thus researchers turned to the use of smart phones, especially after they developed the ability to extract the feature of biometrics. Some authors have suggested using mobile devices in the validation process. Buschek et al. [27] provided a tapping process on the smart phone screen; since the typing pattern is unique to each person, this approach can be used as a validating agent [28, 29] . Belk et al. [30] proposed a paper about the difference between conventional passwords and realistic ones in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, where the latter takes longer. Michelin et al. [31] suggested a facial and iris recognition system by using the smartphone's camera. Jeong et al. [32] developed a scheme combining the smartphone, password, and biometric parameters of the user-creating an MFA system. Nevertheless, the disadvantage of this system is that it deals with limited security threats, and the accuracy of recognition technology based on biometric was not good. Sun et al. [33] presented a scheme based on user biometrics with smartphone information using a fuzzy extractor. This system does not store raw information for biometric measurements, thus, depending on the offline method to change the biometrics or password, it does resist some attacks.
In this paper, we propose the MFA protocol based on a fuzzy extractor of user's fingerprint and a smart mobile phone. Our work can resist malicious attacks and has good features such as mutual authentication, once-secure session key for each login phase, the anonymity of password and biometric, unlinkability, securing against the stolen smart mobile device, and online change of password.
Symbols Used and Cryptography Concepts

Symbols Used
Some basic symbols are used in the search (Table 1 ). 
Symbol Description
AS Authenticated Server.
Adm i
The administrator of a system.
SMD i
Smart mobile device. m
The number of administrators.
ID A i
Identity of administrators.
ID AS
Identity of an authenticated server.
The password of an administrator. 
Symbol Description
The generator of the group. q
A large prime number.
Time of an administrator. T AS Time of an authenticated server.
A secret number of an administrator.
X AS
A secret number of an authenticated server.
∆T
Timestamp.
SK
Session key
Cryptography Concepts
•
The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) key exchange protocol [34] : A and B agree on a finite cyclic group G and choose a generator g from them. They then choose randomly a,b ∈ [1, |G|] and exchange g a and g b . The secret key is g ab . To break the protocol, a passive eavesdropper, i.e., attacker (Eve), must compute the DDH function, defined as DH g (g a , g b ) = g ab . •
Fuzzy Extractor: The fuzzy extractor is a cryptography method for securely authenticating using biometric. Suppose a finite set L is a metric space with a distance function dis along with an error limit, E, calculated using error correction codes (Hamming distance, set difference metric, edit distance metric, etc.) [35, 36] . The fuzzy extractor contains two operations i.e., Generator (Gen) and Reproduction (Rep), with the following features:
The Gen() operation takes a biometric B i ∈ L of user U i as input and outputs a secret string σ i ∈ {0.1} l , and a public string p ∈ {0.1} * , i.e., Gen
The Rep() operation takes a noisy biometric B i ∈ L of user U i and the public string p as input and reproduces the secret string σ i ∈ {0.1} l as an output, i.e.,
• Hash function (MD5) [37] : The cryptographic hash function is MD5 (message digest 5). MD5 generates a 128-bit message digest of the input, which is expressed as a 32-digit hexadecimal number. MD5 hash outputs are unique even if the size of the input is different. • Encryption/Decryption by AES algorithm [38] : The input and output for the AES algorithm contain sequences of 128 bits (digits with values of 0 or 1). These sequences are referred to as blocks and the number of bits they contain as their length. The cipher key for the AES algorithm is a sequence of 128, 192 or 256 bits. Other input, output and cipher key lengths are not permitted by this standard.
Our Proposed Protocol
In this section, we propose a strong multi-factor authentication protocol based on the password and the user's fingerprint in the Internet server system and depended on an application in a smart mobile device. Our protocol includes three main elements-Authenticated Server (AS) such as cloud service provider, Administrator (Adm 1 . . . Adm m ), and Smart Mobile Device (SMD i )-and is divided into four phases: registration, login, authentication, and change password. The registration phase is implemented only once, while the login and authentication phases are performed whenever Adm i needs to log into the system, and the change password phase works at the moment when Adm i wishes to change the password.
Registration Phase
During this phase, our work depends on two steps: the first is related to Adm i that manages the system while the second connects with AS (see Figure 3 ). Cryptography 2019, 4, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 23 
StepR1: Administrator Side:
• should be registered into , they depend on their to complete this process via mobile apps, and this step can be described in the following points:
• enters their Username ( ), Password ( ), and Fingerprint ( ) by using a mobile app.
• After that, applies the generator function of the fuzzy extractor to extract ( , ) from , ( , ) = ( ).
• chooses two large prime integer numbers , ϵ and computes = * .
• generates a random integer number ϵ , computes a secret parameter = ℎ(ℎ( , ), , ) and chooses a private key ( ) (note: is used with things and users).
• After that, creates a Credential file ( ) to save the main parameters ( , , , , , ) into secretly based on = ⨁ ⨁ .
• uses their to send a message = ( , , ) to (see Figure 3a ). StepR1: Administrator Side:
• Adm i should be registered into AS, they depend on their SMD i to complete this process via mobile apps, and this step can be described in the following points: • Adm i enters their Username (ID A i ), Password (PW A i ), and Fingerprint (FP A i ) by using a mobile app.
•
After that, SMD i applies the generator function of the fuzzy extractor to extract (R,P) from FP A i , (R,P) = Gen(FP A i ). • Adm i chooses two large prime integer numbers v, w Z and computes M = v * w. • Adm i generates a random integer number r 0 Z M , computes a secret parameter K A i = h(h(R,r 0 ), ID A i , PW A i ) and chooses a private key (s) (note: s is used with things and users).
After that, Adm i creates a Credential file (CF SMD i ) to save the main parameters (ID A i , r 0 , P, s, v, w) into SMD i secretly based on Figure 3a ).
StepR2: Authenticated Server Side:
Upon receiving a message from Adm i , AS implements the following steps:
• AS checks the identity of Adm i in Index File (IF AS ) and compares ID A i (receiving) ? = ID A i (existing) in IF AS ; if the result is equal, Adm i has been registered in the system. Otherwise, they create a new record to save ID A i of Adm i in IF AS .
AS generates a random integer number r 1 Z M , computes N A i = h(r 1 , ID A i , K A i ), and adds (r 1 , N A i ) to Adm i 's record in IF AS , where N A i contains sensitive information used in the next phases by Adm i . Based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, AS generates a group (G) and chooses a generator g from the group and a large prime number (q), computes D AS = g K A i mod q and saves (M, g, q, D AS ) in IF AS .
•
AS sends M 2 = (N A i , D AS , g, q, ID AS ), to Adm i (see Figure 3b ).
StepR3: Administrator Side:
When the Adm i receives M 2 from AS, they decrypt their
Login Phase
StepL1: Administrator Side:
When Adm i wishes to log into the system, they should perform the following steps (see Figure 4 ):
• They enter Identity (ID A i ), Password (PW A i ), and Fingerprint (FP A i ) by using a mobile device SMD i to allow them to use the important parameters inside CF SMD i . • SMD i applies the reproduction function of the fuzzy extractor to calculate R = Rep (P,FP A i ).
• SMD i verifies the authority of Adm i based on extracting important parameters from the above steps and CF SMD i as follows:
After that, SMD i compares D AS (computing) ? = D AS (existing) in the credential file; if the result is false, they terminate the login phase. Otherwise, SMD i performs the following steps: StepA2: Administrator Side:
After receives from , computes the following steps:
• They check − ≤ ∆ ; if not equal, they abort the authentication phase. Otherwise, they verify (from ) ≟ (from ); if not equal, they terminate the authentication phase. Otherwise, they implement these steps (see Figure 5 ): • Finally, sends to .
StepA3: Authenticated Server Side:
Finally, receives the message from and computes the following steps: computes the session key = mod to decrypt to retrieve ( , , ) = ( ) and check ≟ , ≟ , ≟ ; if the results are true, believes that is legitimate and can manage their devices and access to the services and resource of . Otherwise, terminates this phase. StepA1: Authenticated Server Side:
Upon receiving a message M 3 from Adm i , AS implements the following steps: = ID AS ; if they match, AS calculates the following steps, otherwise AS terminates the authentication phase.
AS computes h AS = h (T A i ||r 2 ||ID A i ) and applies ASCII code for h AS , y AS = length(h AS ) i=1 ASCII(h AS (i)).
AS computes V AS = (g y AS ) X AS mod q, the session key SK AS = V A i X AS mod q, P AS = (V AS ||N A i ), and encrypts (ID A i ||P AS ) by using SK:
StepA2: Administrator Side:
After Adm i receives M 4 from AS, Adm i computes the following steps:
• They check T A i − T AS ≤ ∆T; if not equal, they abort the authentication phase. Otherwise, they verify N A i (from CF SMD i ) ? = N A i (from P AS ); if not equal, they terminate the authentication phase. Otherwise, they implement these steps (see Figure 5 ):
Adm i computes the session key SK = V AS X A i mod q, from decrypts I AS by using SK to retrieve (ID A i , P AS ) = Dec SK (I AS ).
After that, Adm i checks if P AS (from decrypted I AS ) ? = P AS (from M 4 ) and ID A i (from decrypted I AS ) ? = ID A i (existing); if not equal, they terminate the process, otherwise they compute J A i = (ID AS ||D AS ) and encrypt (ID A i ||J A i ) by using SK:
Finally, Adm i sends M 5 to AS. 
Change Password Phase
StepCP1: Administrator Side:
When wants to change their fingerprint ( ) and Password ( ) to a new fingerprint ( ) and a new Password ( ), the following steps are performed (see Figure 6 ):
• enters the specified , , using to log into the system. StepA3: Authenticated Server Side:
Finally, AS receives the message from Adm i and computes the following steps:
AS computes the session key SK = V A i X AS mod q to decrypt M 5 to retrieve (ID = ID AS ; if the results are true, AS believes that Adm i is legitimate and can manage their devices and access to the services and resource of AS. Otherwise, AS terminates this phase.
When Adm i wants to change their fingerprint (FP A i ) and Password (PW A i ) to a new fingerprint (FP A i
) and a new Password (PW A i ), the following steps are performed (see Figure 6 ):
• Adm i enters the specified ID A i , PW A i , FP A i using SMD i to log into the system. • SMD i computes R = Rep(P, FP A i ), and decrypts CF SMD i = CF SMD i ⊕ R ⊕ PW A i to allow Adm i to use important parameters inside CF SMD i . • SMD i checks ID A i of Adm i with the value stored in CF SMD i when ID A i is correcting, they compute 
• Eventually, SMD i updates the values (D AS ,P ) in CF SMD i , encrypts 
Security Analysis
In this part, we prove that our proposed protocol is safe and secure against well-known malicious attacks such as eavesdropping and traffic attacks. Additionally, the proposed protocol has provided robust features such as mutual authentication, password anonymity, and secure session key and we support the comparative analysis of related authentication protocols. As a result, our work has been verified based on AVISPA Tool, denoting that our protocol is secure and safe (see 
StepCP2: Authenticated Server Side:
When AS receives M 6 from Adm i , AS follows these steps:
; if not equal, they terminate the request.
•
AS computes new D AS = g K A i mod q, and checks D AS (computing) ? = D AS (from M 6 ); if the equation is not equal, the process ends. Otherwise, they update the value of D AS in IF AS with D AS .
Security Analysis
In this part, we prove that our proposed protocol is safe and secure against well-known malicious attacks such as eavesdropping and traffic attacks. Additionally, the proposed protocol has provided robust features such as mutual authentication, password anonymity, and secure session key and we support the comparative analysis of related authentication protocols. As a result, our work has been verified based on AVISPA Tool, denoting that our protocol is secure and safe (see Tables 2-7) .
Proposition 1.
Our protocol provides mutual authentication.
Proof. Mutual authentication means both Administrator (Adm i ) and Authenticated Server (AS) validate each other. Our protocol therefore focuses on three components (Adm i , SMD i , and AS) to achieve this feature.
In the login phase side, Adm i wants to log into the system based on their mobile device SMD i applying the following steps:
1.
SMD i checks the validity of Adm i 's parameters (ID A i , PW A i , and FP A i ) by applying the fuzzy extractor function to compute D AS = g K A i mod q.
2.
Then, SMD i compares D AS ? = D AS (existing in the credential file); if the result is false, Adm i is not authorized and terminates the login phase. Otherwise, SMD i computes V A i = (g y A i ) X A i mod q,
They send M 3 = ((ID AS ||r 2 ), U A i , T A i ) to AS.
Upon receiving M 3 , the authentication phase is started with the first step, abd AS ensures the authority of Adm i as follows:
1.
AS checks time stamp T AS − T A i ≤ ∆T; if so, they compare ID AS ? = ID AS , and, if not a match, they ensure the Adm i is not authorized. Otherwise, they compute the following steps: AS computes V AS = (g y AS ) X AS mod q, the session key SK = V A i X AS mod q, and P AS = (V AS ||N A i ), and encrypts (ID A i ||P AS ) by using SK:
2.
AS sends M 4 = (I AS , P AS , T AS ) to Adm i .
1.
They check T A i − T AS ≤ ∆T and N A i (from CF SMD i ) ? = N A i (from P AS ); if the results are not equal, they know the AS is unauthorized and terminate the authentication phase. Otherwise, they implement these steps: Adm i decrypts I AS by using SK to retrieve (ID = ID A i (existing); if the results are equal, they terminate the process, otherwise they compute J A i = (ID AS ||D AS ) and encrypt (ID A i ||J A i ) by using SK:
2.
Adm i sends M 5 to AS as a second factor. = ID AS ; if the results are true, AS believes that Adm i is legitimate and can manage their devices and access to the services and resource of AS. Otherwise, AS terminates this phase. Therefore, our proposed protocol has mutual authentication feature in a secure manner. Table 7 explains the safety of mutual authentication in a practical sense, based on AVISPA.
Finally, AS retrieves the (ID
Proposition 2.
Our protocol provides a once-secure session key.
Proof. In our protocol, the session key is used between Adm i and AS in the login and authentication phases, which plays a vital role in the encrypting or decrypting of exchanging messages between Adm i and AS. The main equation to create a once-secure session key is as follows:
In the authenticated server side, AS ensures the validity information of Adm i and then retrieves V A i = (U A i || −1 D AS ) and applies the above equation depending on secret parameter X AS . After that, they use SK to encrypt Enc SK (ID A i ||P AS ) and send (P AS ,I AS , T AS ) to Adm i . Finally, Adm i calculates (SK
ASCII(h AS (i)), V AS = (g y AS ) X AS mod q, and P AS = (V AS ||N A i ). From P AS and decrypted I AS , Adm i verifies the information received from AS. The r 2 mainly contributes to generating one SK for each login phase. Assuming an adversary tries to obtain SK, they fail to access secure parameters (r 2 , X A i , X As , h A i , h AS , y A i , y AS , g, and q). As a result, our proposed protocol provides a once-secure session key and the experimental results in Table 7 refer to the secrecy of SK.
Proposition 3. Our protocol provides anonymity of password and biometrics.
Proof. When the administrator starts to register in the system, they use their main parameters based on their Identity (ID A i ), Password (PW A i ), and Fingerprint (FP A i ). They compute the following points:
• SMD i applies the generation function of the fuzzy extractor on FP A i , extracts the main values (R, P) = Gen(FP A i ), generates a random integer number r 0 Z M , and computes K A i = h(h(R,r 0 ),
Administrator's parameters (R, K A i ) are not saved in AS and CF SMD i while each pair of (P, r 0 ) is saved in CF SMD i and other parameters (ID A i , D AS , N A i , and M) are saved as anomalous elements in AS to check the validity of Adm i in the login and authentication phases (where N A i = h(r 1 , ID A i ,
Assuming an attacker has the ability to access the main parameters (P, r 0 , D AS , N A i , and M), the attacker cannot know the details of Adm i or AS as these parameters have been saved in an anomalous way and they fail to use it again to login instead of Adm i .
Proposition 4.
Our protocol provides unlinkability.
Proof. This feature confirms that an administrator may try multiple logins to the server to use resources/services without others being able to link these logins together [39] . In our proposed protocol, each time Adm i wants to log into the system they submit M 3 = ((ID AS ||r 2 ), U A i , T A i ) to AS. Thus, the primitive components of M 3 are generated once for each login phase by using the following points:
• SMD i generates a random integer number r 2 Z M and computes h A i = h(T A i ||r 2 ||ID A i ).
As a result, the primitive parameters of M 3 generate once and AS cannot link many logins with the same Adm i . Proposition 5. Our protocol is secure against stolen smart mobile devices.
Proof. When a smart mobile device (SMD i ) is stolen, an attacker cannot use the SMD i unless they know the device password or biometric factor. However, assuming the attacker succeeds in obtaining the device password and accessing the application, they will not be able to use it as the application needs Identity (ID A i ), Password (PW A i ), and a live Fingerprint (FP A i ) for the account owner in the application (the authorized user). We refer that the credential file was saved in an encrypted way CF SMD i = CF SMD i ⊕ R ⊕ PW A i . Furthermore, it is difficult to decrypt CF SMD i depending on the password and fingerprint of Adm i and an attacker fails to have any advantages from stolen smart mobile device. Proposition 6. Our protocol is resistant to replay attacks.
Proof. The attacker takes the information and sends it later without modification. Supposing the attacker intercepts messages M 3 = ((ID AS ||r 2 ), U A i , T A i ) and M 4 = (I AS , P AS , T AS ) and tries to use it to log into the system. This login has one result that an attacker fails to use these parameters as the time is terminated and ((T AS − T A i ≤ ∆T), (T A i − T AS ≤ ∆T)) are not achieved and the other values (r 2 , U A i , I AS , and P AS ) have been generated only once. Therefore, our protocol is safe against replay attacks. Proof. MITM is intercepting a conversation between the parties to the communication; the conversation appears normal for both parties, however, all the information exchanged passes through the attacker, and they can eavesdrop or modify and re-send. We assume that the attacker has obtained M 3 = ((ID AS ||r 2 ), U A i , T A i ) and modified it as M 3 * = ( (ID AS r 2 ) * , U A i * , T A i * ); the modified message does not work, as the AS verifies the ID AS * that was sent by the Adm i , and finds that (ID AS ID AS * ). In addition, AS cannot get the value of (r 2 ) from (ID AS r 2 ) * . Additionally, the message M 3 is generated once for each login phase. Thus, our protocol does not allow MITM attacks.
Proposition 8.
Our protocol is resistant to an insider attack.
Proof. This type of attack means that an authorized person has the ability to access the system and apply some negative changes. We assume that an authorized person (Adm 1 ) wants to obtain another authorized person's device (Adm 2 ) to access their account (Adm 2 ) or (Adm 1 ) using (Adm 2 )'s account in an unauthorized manner. According to our protocol, (Adm 1 ) cannot do this attack, as the application needs a live fingerprint (FP A i ) of the (Adm 2 ), ensuring that the owner of the original device cannot be impersonated. In addition, the file is protected against stolen/used device as it is encrypted CF SMD i = CF SMD i ⊕ R ⊕ PW A i with a value R that requires a live fingerprint to extract (R,P) = Gen(FP A i ). As a result, our protocol is resistant to an insider attack.
Proposition 9.
Our protocol is resistant to eavesdropping and traffic attacks.
Proof. This is the process of intercepting and examining messages to extract information from them. All messages exchanged between the Adm i and AS are the parameters used only once (r 2 , U A i , I AS , P AS , and J A i ), thus, if the eavesdropping and traffic attacks intercept these parameters, the attackers fail to enter the system.
Note that the messages M 3 , M 4 , and M 5 are generated once for each admin's login request. Accordingly, our protocol is resistant to eavesdropping and traffic attacks. Proposition 10. Our protocol can resist the offline dictionary attack.
Proof. The dictionary here is a list of words that attackers believe to be used by Adm i in the formulation of their password. In our protocol, collecting login's messages does not help the attacker to predicate Adm i s password. We assume that an attacker catches values during each of Adm i 's login requests (r 2 ,
, which are generated once by SMD i , and these values cannot be used again. As a result, our protocol is resistant to an offline dictionary attack. 
Experimental Results
To implement and simulate the presented protocol on AVISPA, we focused on the main tool called Security Protocol Animator (SPAN) Version 1.6 on a computer system containing Windows 10 Enterprise operating system (64 bit), supported by Ubuntu 10.10 light on Virtual machine, Intel (R) Core (TM) i7-7500U CPU @ 2.70 GHz 2.90 GHz processor, and 8 GB RAM. We executed our proposal protocol considering a minimal number of components included in Server-Client/IoT (i.e., administrator, authentication server, and device) based on Dolev-Yao model with a restricted number of sessions, detected goal, On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC) and Constraint-Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe) backend [40] .
The AVISPA Tool
The AVISPA tool is one of the new techniques used to analyze and study the security of protocols used. It is a generally accepted and strong software tool for automatically authenticating (depending on push-button technique) the security characteristics of the protocols used in Server-Client/Internet of Things (see Figure 7 ).
The protocol was implemented in HLPSL (the High-Level Protocol Specification Language) language, and, after the protocol as written, a HLPSL2IF translator converted this code into an Intermediate Format (IF) [41, 42] . The steps of back-ends are as follows:
1.
On-the-fly model-checker (OFMC) 2.
Constraint-logic based attack searcher (CL-AtSe) 3.
SAT-based model-checker (SATMC) 4.
Tree automata based on automatic approximation for the analysis of security protocols (TA4SP) Based on HLPSL specification, our proposed protocol consists of:
1. Basic Role explains the activity of the objects (e.g., Authenticated Server and Administrator of a system ) contained in the protocol (see Tables 2 and 3 ). 2. Transitions are defined as steps. The first basic role starts with a statement containing the beginning. This status only changes after receiving a message. 3. Composed Roles contain one or more basic roles to implement together and denote the sessions involved in the protocol (see Table 4 ). 4. Environment contains all sessions; the attacker may perform some roles as an authorized user (see Table 5 ). • Request (Adm, AS, admin_authserver_m, M6'): It represents the strong authenticity of Adm by AS on M6' with an identity admin_authserver_m. 
Security Features
We compared the security features of our proposed protocol with some protocols from previous studies, as shown in Table 8 . 
We compared the security features of our proposed protocol with some protocols from previous studies, as shown in Table 8 . Description of the Output of AVISPA Tool The output created by the AVISPA tool contains the following sections (see Table 7 ): applied our proposed protocol for AVISPA and the results indicate our protocol is safe against famous attacks such as MITM, replay, and insider. The real information of the administrator's system is saved in an anomalous way. The information of the administrator is saved as an encrypted credential file in a mobile device. In addition, in our work, the phase of changing the password in an online mode. Our proposed protocol has many security features such as mutual authentication, unlinkability, the anonymity of password and biometric, and a once-secure session key. Our protocol has the benefit to authenticate the administrator in the Internet system, owner's devices of IoT, and cloud computing. Finally, the work can be applied using modern environments such as cloud computing and cloud service provider. We can add another biometric fingerprint or a light factor such as a SMS message. 
